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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN G. HENDRIE COMPANY, INC.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH, LAURE1TTA M. GLADDEN, widow,
and LOUISE GLADDEN, for and on behalf of
DARLENE LOUISE GLADDEN, minor child of
CLARENCE ROLAND GLADDEN, deceased.
Defendants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a proceeding under the statutes to review
an award of Workmen's Compensation made by the
Industrial Conunission to the dependants of Clarence
R Gladden, deceased, who was killed in an accident on
February 16, 1959.
It is admitted by all, and there is no dispute that
at the tin1e of the accident and death of the decedent
he was an employee of the plaintiff company, which was
engaged in the performance of a contract for the con-
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struction of a swirrrming pool at Clearfield, Utah, and
that the accident and death occurred on the job site
and during the normal hours of employment. In the
proceedings before the Industrial Commission, the defense of the plaintiff here was based upon the contention, to which plaintiff here adheres, that at the
time of the accident the decedent Gladden had departed
from his employment and that the accident did not
arise out of or in the course of his employment as required by Section 35-1-45 U.C.A., 1953.
We shall endeavor to outline all of the evidence on
this point for the assistance of the court.
In the course of this presentation we shall refer to
the plaintiff John G. Gendri'e Company as the Employer
and to the decedent Clarence R. Gladden as the employee.
On the morning of the accident the employe!e worked
a part of the morning. At that time, according to the
undisputed testimony of the witness Kahre, Mr. S. W.
(Bill) Smith, the superintendent of construction on the
job (R-20) had told the employee there was nothing
more for him to do-that he should go home, but the
employee said "No, he was going to put in to noon
anyway", and that at about that time "the digger came
along and Smith said, 'Well, you can go ahead and wait
until noon, and we will get these planks around the
pool and the plumbing pipes.' " The employee continued on the job, apparently with this assignment of
distributing some planks and plumbing pipes about
the job site.
On this day Smith and one Verne Kahre and the
employee Gladden were the only employees of the em2
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ployer on the job, although there were other ernployees
of ~ubcontractors or equipment furnishers (R-75).
While Srnith was superintendent of construction
( R-:20), there is no evidence whatsoever in the record
that he had any duties or authority except in connection
with the actual construction work.
The digger or backhoe, operated by one Rex M.
rrerkelson, dug a trench along one side of the pool
proper, the bottom and walls of which had been previously installed. The ditch was for the purpose of
laying pipes for the drainage and water circulation
~ystem. The digger completed the ditch along one side
and started work on another portion. Sometime about
mid-afternoon, and forty-five minutes to an hour prior
to the fatal accident, a small portion of the ditch near
the end where the digger was then working slid off.
At that time the employee Gladden was further up the
ditch in the shallow portion. Superintendent Smith
at that tirne ordered the employee Gladden to get out
of the trench and to stay out and not to be caught in
there under any circumstances. The giving of these
orders was heard by the witnesses, Rex M. Terkelson
and Verne C. Kahre, who fully corroborated the fact
of their giving. Indeed, the fact that the orders were
given is not disputed. (R-22 lines 18 to 24; lines 14
to 19; 26 and 27, lin·es 20 to 25 and 7 to 8; 55 and 56,
lines 16 to 25 and 1 to 25; 57, lines 1 to 8; 72; 79; and
87).
The ernployee Gladden acknowledged the order.
(R-32 lines 11 to 13; and 72, 78 and 79). In fact, the
3
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employee told Smith that the employee was "able to
take care of himself." (R-72) Superintendent Smith
never changed or modified the order thus given. (R-32)
Smith was the only man on the job authorized to give
orders of this kind. (R-32) No one saw the actual
accident when the trench caved in. The witness Kahre
was in the swimming pool and heard Smith call out,
"Man in the trench" and immediately went out to the
site of the accident, where the trench had been 3:lj2 to
4 feet deep. Kahre dug decedent out with the help of
other workmen. After the accident, the decedent was
found "in a squatting position ... like he was squatting
down smoking or just passing the time of day." (R-7071) If he had been standing up, the cave-in would
have hit him about the middle of his stomach. By all
indications, he wasn't working. (72) This is clear, because at the time ther:e was no work to be done in the
trench at that particular point (R-27, line 16 to 25;
22, lines 8 to 11; and 72). The decedent was dead by
the time he could be extricated.
About nine o'clock that Bvening Kahre and Smith
received a call at their Motel from a Mrs. Little, who
asked Smith and Kahre to come to their home at Clearfield to talk to Mrs. Gladden. They went. (R-74)
Up to this point there is no dispute in any of the
evidence. However, the testimony as to the conversation which took place at the Little home and the
statements ther·e made by Smith is conflicting. According to the witnesses, Lauretta Gladden, Marvis Little
and Irene Pelton, :Mr. Smith said that he was sorry
it happened, and he shouldn't have sent Mr. Gladden
4
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down into the ditch. (R-38 and 39; 90; and 92). On the
contrary, Smith categorically denies having Inade any
8ueh statements (R-21; 26 and 23), and his version
is corroborated h~r the witness Kahre, who testified that
Smith's statmnent was "I am sorry to meet you under
these circuinstances. I am sorry it happened," that
"If he had did what I told him to do this morning it
would never have happened." (R-75) Kahre further
testified that Smith further stated to :Mrs. Gladden
and the others at the Little home that Smith had told
the decedent that morning there was nothing for him
to do and that he should go on home, but that Smith,
at Gladden's insistance, permitted him to stay and
directed him to "get the planks around the pool and the
plumbing pipes." (R-75) Kahre doesn't recall Smith
ever Inaking a statement to the effect that it was his
fault and that he shouldn't have sent Clarence down
into the trench. (R-76)
It must be observed that the only evidence whatsoever to contradict the positive evidence that the employee Gladden had disobeyed orders and departed
from his employment in entering the ditch is the disputed hearsay testimony above mentioned by the witnesses Gladden, Pelton and Little. There is no evidence
to indicate that Smith, a superintendent of construction,

was authorized to make admissions with respect to
claims against the company or to negotiate with the
claimant Mrs. Gladden concerning the facts of the accident or any asserted libility. It is obvious, from the
record, that Smith was invited to the Little home to
discuss this question of liability.

5
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STATEME1NT OF POINTS

Point 1. There is a presumption that the deceased employee was not ordered back into the trench by the
employer's superintendent of construction.
Point 2. There is no presumption that deceased employee was order-ed back into the trench, or that he
would not have entered the same unless ordered to do so.
Point 3. The evidence relating to the claimed admissions by the employer's superintendent of construction
is hearsay and legally incompetent, and cannot support the award of the Commission.
Point 4. There is no competent evidence to support the
findings and award of the Commission.
ARGUMENT

Point 1. There is a presumption that the deceased employee was not ordered back into the trench by the
employer's superintendent of construction.
The existence of the presumption that Smith's orders
to stay out of the trench continued in full force and
effect to the time of the accident has double support in
the facts and the law.
First, it is established without controversy and by
the testimony of three witnesses that before the accident the trench in question had already caved in twice,
and that Superintendent Smith, within an hour or less,
had ordered decedent to stay out of the trench and
not to get caught therein on any account. Snrith testified positively that this direct order was never withdrawn or countern1anded. The reasonableness and logic
6
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of this testimoy is supported h)· the inferences from the
uncontroverted fact that cribbing was planned and intended to be coinpleted before any further work should
be done in the trench.
Thus, in point of fact decedent Gladden was, within
the hour, under orders to stay out of the trench. Under
the law of Utah, and inde·ed under the law generally
accepted in America, a state of facts once shown to exist
is presmned to continue unchanged, at least for a reasonable time under all of the circumstances surrounding the
situation, in the absence of positive, affirmative evidence
proving a subsequent change in the existing facts or
circumstances. Thus, in the case of
Jensen vs. Logan City (1936)
89 Utah 347, 57 Pacific 2nd 708,
the Supreme Court held that evidence that on a certain
evening loose wires from a cut fence were bent back and
around an adjoining post raised a controlling inference
or presumption which prevailed even over some evidence
that such wires were found out across the sidewalk
some hours later.
This is an example of the application of the general
rule that when things are once proved to have existed
in a particular state they are presumed to have continued in that state until the contrary is established
by evidence either direct or presumptive.
See I Jones on Evidence Fourth Edition
Page 101 Section 58.
The rule is applicable to a status of personal re-

7
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lations, such as the influence of duress by threat.
Eureka Bank vs. Bay (Kansas)
135 Pacific 584.
The application of this rule here is re-enforced by every
reasonable consideration of humanity, legality of action
by employers, and human nature in general. In addition,
there is the fact testified to by Kahre and Smith that
there was no reason whateV'er to order decedent back
into the trench at that particular time and point, as
the work in the trench had been completed there.
The presumption that Smith did not countermand
his pr'evious instructions and order decedent back into
the trench as contended gains further legal and factual
support here from the well nigh universal and very
strong presumption of innocence, in favor of legality,
and of compliance with law and of rightful action and
performance of duty.
Under Section 35-1-12 UCA 1953, it is provided
that:
"No employer shall construct or occupy or
maintain any place of employment that is not
safe, or require or knowingly permit any employee to be in any employment or place of employment which is not safe ... and no employer
shall fail or neglect to do every other thing necessary to protect the life, health, safety, and welfare of his employees ... "
Under Sections 68 and 69 of the General Safety
Orders of The Industrial Commission of Utah, revised
edition 1959, it was clearly unlawful to order or to permit decedent to work in the trench under its known con-

8
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clition at and prior to the time of the accident. Shoring
or cribbing was required before this could be done.
Under the provisions of Section 35-1-39 UCA, 1953 the
violation of the statute above-mentioned, and failure,
neglect, or refusal to obey the lawful safety orders of
the Commission is a criminal offense.
As above indicated, under these circumstances, there
arises a very strong presumption of innocence, in favor
of legality and compliance with the law, and of rightful
action and performance of duty by the 'employer and his
superintendent. This presumption, of course, negatives any order by Mr. Smith directing decedent into
the dangerous trench, as such an order would be in
violation of duty, and criminal. Thus, the presumption
is that no such order was given.
This presumption in favor of innocence and In
favor of legality and performance of duty applies In
civil cases as well as in criminal cases :
31 CJS "Evidence," page 728 Section 130; page
769, Section 134; and page 840, Section 150.
20 Am. Jur. "Evidence", Sec. 221, p. 217; Sec.
226, p. 221.
In said Section 221 of American Jurisprudence it
IS said:
''One of the strongest disputable presumptions
known to the law is the presumption "that a
person is innocent of crime." This presumption
applies not only in criminal cases, but also in
civil cases where the commission of the crime
come collaterally in question." (Emphasis added.)
This presu1nption has found familiar application in
Utah in the presumption against fraud:
9
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Utah National Bank vs. Nelson,
38 Utah 160, 111 Pacific 9CY7,
and the presumption that persons living together as
man and wife are legally married:
In re: Pilcher's Estate
114 Utah 72, 197 Pacific 2nd 143.
It is one of the most favored presumptions in the law.
See
I Jones on E1vidence - Civil Cases, Fourth Edition,
Section 12 and Section 101.
In the latter section the learned author says that;
"Generally speaking, no legal presumption is so
highly favored as that of innocence; ordinarly
substantially all other presumptions yield to it
in case of conflict."
Thus, a favored and overpowering presumption in
favor of innocence and lawful activity buttresses and
supports the positive testimony of Mr. Smith and Mr.
Kahre that the decedent was ordered to remain out of
the trench, and Mr. Smith's testimony that such order
was not countermanded by any later order.
The testimony is further supported by all reasonable inferences from the clearly established facts and
circumstances surrounding the occurrence and by the
fact that under the Jensen vs. Logan City case, above
cited, th'e order admittedly given is presumed to continue in effect until a revocation is affirmatively shown.

Point 2. There is no presumption that deceased
e'mployee was ordered back into the trench, or that he

10
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not have entered the same unless ordered to do

so.
In its decision, the Industrial Commission said
(Rl08):
We can legally presume that a servant obeys
the orders of his master. We can legally presume
that any individual will take necessary precautions to protect his own life.
''Nothing is the record explains why Mr. Gladden
should have ent ered the ditch in violation of the
order of Mr. Smith. The presumption is that
lVIr. Gladden would not have entered the dangerous ditch unless ordered to do so by Mr. Smith.
1

With these unsupported and inapplicable l'egal statements included by the Commission in its decision, the
plaintiff ernployer takes very sharp issue. It is respectfully submitted that in following these statements the
Cmnmission inadvertently erred, and that this in turn
led it into error in making the award.
The presumption, generally recognized in negligence
tort cas·es, that a decedent is presumed to be in due
care for his life until evidence is presented to the contrary, does not apply in a Workmen's Compensation
case, where the question is whether or not an accident
arose out of or in the course of employment, rather
than whether or not the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence. The Commission dragged this
presumption in by the heels from an entirely different
branch of the law. It should not have done so. Presumably without the benefit of this presumption, improperly relied on, th'e Commission would have reached
a contrary conclusion under the evidence.

11
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In Utah there is no presumption that an employee
killed within the limits of his employment in terms of
space and time in fact died in an accident arsing out of
or in the course of his emplopnent. On the contrary the
burden is on the claimant, even in death cases, to prove
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the death
resulted from an accident arising out of or in the course
of his employment.
Bingham Mines Company vs. Allsop
59 Utah 306, 203 Pacific 644 Headnote Number 3.
Higley vs. Industrial Commission
75 Utah 361, 368, 285 Pacific 306;
D. H. Perry Estate vs. Industrial Commission
79 Utah 8, 7 Pacific 2nd 269.
Thompson vs. Industrial Commission
82 Utah 247, 23 Pacific 2nd 930.
The problem of presumption affecting the proof
of death by accident arising out of or in the course of
employment is discussed in 100 CJS, 462 et seq., "W arkmen's Compensation," Section 513 b. It appears that
there are some states where presumptions have been
created by statute to the :effect that, in cases of death
or inability to testify, a workman is presumed to be in
the course of his employment if he is within the time
and spatial boundaries of his employment at the time
of his death, and perhaps in one or two states such a
presumption is indulged by virtue of judicial decision.
However, Utah has no such statute, and such judicial
decisions can have no force or effect in Utah in the
face of the Utah decisions above cited under this point,
or in the fac:e of authorities cited under Point 1. Moreover, other authorities hold that under similar cir-

12
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no presumption arises that the employee was
in the course of his e1nployment.
100 CJB Page 466, Citing
:Mello vs. Industrial Accident Commission of California 258 Pacific 104, and
Re·ed vs. Sensenbaugh (Missouri Appeals)
86 Southwestern 2nd 388, and
71 OJ Page 1061, Note 10.
:Moreover, all such presumptions in favor of the
employee shift only the burden of going forward: "Such
presumptions are rebuttable and they disappear on th'e
introduction of evidence to the contrary."
100 CJS 465,
Notes 33 and 34, and cases there cited.
The extremely able and r espected Massachusetts
Court had occasion to consider a case almost exactly
like the one under consideration, although the claimants there had the aid of a statutory presumption
and hence Were in a stronger position than the claimants here. See
1

LeBlanc's Case,
125 Northeastern 2nd 129.
In that case the Massachusetts Court held that where
an employee was found crushed between an elevator
and its shaft, and the e1nployee had been forbidden to
operate the elevator and instructed to ride on another
elevator, the orders forbidding him to operate the
elevators having been given on two occasions several
days prior to the accident, a statutory presumption that
his presence on the elevator was connected with his employment could not operate, and his dependent was
13
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not entitled to compensation. The court in effect held
that the presun1ption, even though raised by statute,
applies only in the basence of all contrary or conflicting
evidence~ it merely shifts the duty to go forward, but
not the risk of non-persuasion.
Here the evidence is positive and uncontrovered
that within an hour prior to the accident the decedent
had r'eceived positive orders, which he understood and
acknowledged, to the effect that he was to stay completely out of the trench. There is further evidence
that there was no reason for him to be in the trench
which was connected with his employment. The presumptions of the continuation of these lawful orders
arises by virtue of the Jensen vs. Logan City case, supra,
and receives further very strong support from the
universal presumption of innocence of crime and of
compliance with law, as hereinbefore argued. As
against all of these things, plus Smith's positive testimony that the order to stay out remained effective and
was never countermanded, we have only claimed oral
admissions alleged to have been made by Smith, th~
construction superintendent, at a meeting solicited by
friends and relatives of the decedent's widow, whose first
and primary concern (even on the evening of decedent's
death) was money. Further, these alleged admissions
are disputed not only by Smith, but by the independent
and disinterested witness Kahre.

e011ec ~*" i"'

In passing, it should be said 1l=rt any presumption
of "du'e care" (although irrelevant) and any presumption (if there be one) that servants today obey their
masters~the very presence of the decedent employee in

'ih•t

14
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the trench, at the time and under the circumstances
and in the face of clear and uncountermanded orders,
clearly and effectively rubuts and removes such pre~umptions and each of them. Res ipsa loquitur. The
only orders established by cmnpetent evidence were
to stay out of the trench, and decedent's presence in the
trench proves that he was not following such orders.
It is sub1nitted that under the authorities and under
thP facts, the Commission's findings and award are
not supported by the presumptions with which the Commission sought to bolster a desired result.
In conclusion on this point, the specified burden
of proof resting on the claimants is in effect a presumption that a decedent was not in the course of his
employn1ent when killed, and this presumption carries
through to the end of the case and until overcome by a
preponderance of the evidence. The general subject of
presumption is discussed by the Utah court in several
Utah cases. Alnong the most recent and thorough discussions are those to be found in:
Wyatt vs. Baughman,
121 Utah 123, 239 Pacific 2nd 193, and
Wood vs. Strevell-Patterson Hardware Company
(1957), 6 Utah 2nd 340, 313 Pacific 2nd 800.
Under the rules there announced and under those
hereinbefore referred to, any presumption that decedent
Gladden was in the trench pursuant to orders from his
superior or was ther~e in the course of his employment
were rebutted and completely disappeared from the
case immediately upon introduction of the testimony of
.Jiessrs. Smith, Terkelson, and Kahre to the effect that

15
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decedent had been ordered to stay acompletely out of
the trench. An employer does not have to tie an employee with an apron string to prove a limiting order.

.Point 3. The evidence relating to the claimed admissions by the employe~ s superintendent of construction is hearsay and legally incompetent, and cannot support the award of the Commission.
There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever in the
record to prove that Smith was authorized by defendant corporation to adjust the claims for money asserted
on the evening of the accident, to stipulate any facts, or
to make any admissions of fact in behalf of the corporation. He was purely a construction superintendent.
The alleged admissions do not in any way relate to
the prosecution of his employers business of construction of swimming pools, but on the contrary relate to
an entirely extraneous and separate matter: namely,
a claim for money again the corporation involving legal
questions respecting which only an attorney could lawfully represent a corporation, as such representation
involved the practice of law. He was not a general
managing agent, but merely a superintendent of construction with duties confined to the prosecution of the
work of construction.
Furthermore, the alleged admissions were not made
either at the place, or during the time or in the course
of his employment, but on the contrary were made many
miles from the scene, at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Little,
and some six hours or more after the accident, and some·
four hours or more after the close of the working day,
during a meeting solicited by relatives of the claimant
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Lauretta Gladden.
employer.

He was there for them; not for his

rrhe alleged statements or admissions show on their
face that they were adverse to the principal, and hence
presented notice to the claimant that there was no
authority to Inake the same. From the time of presentation of the claiin to the managing authorities and attorneys of employer corporation to this date the authorized authorities of the employer have denied the validity
of and refused to be bound by the alleged admission.
It clearly follows that under the law of evidence,
as established in Utah and elsewhere, these alleged admissions were and are hearsay and were not competent
as evidence against the employer corporation in this
proceeding.

S. W. Bridges & Company vs. Candland
88 Utah 373, 54 Pacific 2nd 842;
31 CJS "Evidence" Page 1115 Note 63;
I Jones on Evidence in Civil Cases, Fourth Edition, Section 255, pages 488 and following.
See also I Jones on Evidence in Civil Cases,
Fourth Edition, Section 357, Page 659.
In the Candland Case Supra} the Supreme Court
held that statements of an agent employed to sell wool
belonging to defendant, made after the transaction, to
the effect that the plaintiff had failed to carry out
the contract and had caused loss to the defendant, were
not admissable as admissions of the principal} since
not within the agent's authority. The case is exactly
in point. The rule is substantially universal.
Of course, under the statutes relating to proceed-
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ings before the Industrial Commission (Section 35-1-88,
DCA, 1953), the Commission is not bound by the regular
rules of evidence as established by the Supreme Court
of Utah, and it can receive incompetent hearsay evidence,
so that no objection to the admission of the evidenc~e
presented would avail. However,the Supreme Court
of Utah has specifically held that, while the Industrial
Commission may admit incompetent hearsay ;evidence,
it cannot use the same as a basis of a finding or award.
Ogden Iron Works vs. Industrial Commission
102 Utah 492, 132 Pacific 2nd 376.
This case is exactly in point. The testimony as to
Smith's alleged admission made outside the scope of
his employment is pure hearsay and completely incompetent, and cannot form the basis of any award.
There is therefore, no competent evidence to show,
that the decedent, at the time of the accident, was within
the course of, or that the accident arose out of his employment, but on the contrary all of the competent
evidence positively and affirmatively shows without
any doubt that at the time and place of the accident
the decedent had departed from the course of his employment and the accident did not arise therefrom.

Point 4. There is no competent evidence to support the findings and award of the Commission.
Point 4 follows more or less as a corollary upon
the points previously discussed herein.
In Utah the employer has a right to define and to
limit the duties and place of employment of its employees. In this case, by orders of the ;employer's sup-
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erintendent of construction, given in accordance with
the rrquirenwnts of law, and which under the evidence
and the presumptions applicable were never countermanded, the ditch was excluded from the area of employmcnt and all duty which could be there performed was
e:rcl11dcd from the employment of the deceased emNevertheless, for some unknown
ployee Gladden.
reason decedent did enter into the ditch, violating
specific instructions as to employment area and duty.
When he did so, he departed from the course of his
employment, and the accident did not and could not
arise from his employment. See the controlling Utah
cases of
Utah Copper Company vs. Industrial Commission, 62 Utah 33, 217 Pacific 1105, 33 AL,R 1327,
and
Salt Lake City vs. The Industrial Commission
103 Utah 581, 137 Pacific 2nd 364.
See also LeBlanc's Case, from Massachusetts, supra,
which is substantially on all fours with the case at Bar.
In view of th efact that all of the competent evidence
agrees that the employee left his employment, we do
not have to prove why he did so. Only he knows, and
there are a million reasons why he might have done
so, all of then1 in violation of orders, and all of them
involving his departure from his employment.. However, we can well infer from the evidence in the case
that as he stated he thought "he could take care of
himself," and had stooped down into the trench to
light or smoke a cigarette.
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It is interesting to note in passing that there is
no evidence that he had any tools with him when he
entered the trench.
When the incompetent, unauthorized, and hearsay
statements attributed to the superintendent Smith are
disregarded, as they must be in considering whether
there is any evidence on which to base an award, there
there is not one scintilla of evidence, and not one thin
presumption to show that the deceased employee's accident in this case arose out of or in the course of his
employment. On the contrary, all of the evidence and
all lawful presumptions join to show that the decedent
had departed from his employment at the time of the
accident, and was in a place where he had no duties
whatsoever and where he was specifically forbidden to
be. Under these circumstances, there is no competent
evidence to support the findings and award of the
Commission and the same must, as a matter of law, be
reversed and vacated.
Such should be the order of this court.
Respectfully submitted,
Paul Thatcher, of
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
1018 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
and
FUGATE, MAY, :MITCHaM and
McGINLEY,
Mining Exchange Bldg.
Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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